How the Neocons took over the Republican Party

By Joseph

…Power does its work by stealth, and the powerful can subsequently deny that their strength was ever used at all. — Salman Rushdie

It would be in 1992 that the US Geopolitical foreign policy began to take shape. It was conceived in the minds of three people who were staffers for Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Lewis Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, and Zalmay Khalilzad formulated what would be known as the Defense Planning Guidance.

The DPG was supposed to be a classified document that not only outlined U.S. military strategies, but it also provided a framework for developing the defense budget after the Soviet Union fell. It was somehow leaked to the press and the NY Times and the Washington Post published it.

When this document was published, it caused a uproar with the Democrats in Congress, and in the Bush administration. Even the America people began to demand that the DPG be rescinded.
Here is what the DPG contained:

Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia. There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the United States must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.
The U.S. also should aim:

To address sources of regional conflict and instability in such a way as to promote increasing respect for international law, limit international violence, and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems.
If necessary, the United States must be prepared to take unilateral action. (Please note : there is NO mention in the draft document of the U.S. taking collective action through the United Nations. To the writers of the DPG, coalitions hold considerable promise for promoting collective action, but it also states the U.S. should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies formed to deal with a particular crisis and which may not outlive the resolution of the crisis.)

What is most important is the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S. and that the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated or in a crisis that calls for quick response. (To view the original draft DPG and supporting documents, see the National Security Archive, February 26, 2008.)
Because of the firestorm this draft created, President Bush never signed onto the DPG. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney did endorse it. Khalilzad told the author James Mann that Cheney was impressed by it, allegedly telling Khalilzad, ( who was responsible for the actual writing of the DPG, Youve discovered a new rationale for our role in the world.) James Mann, The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bushs War Cabinet

In the book, Mann also stated the following:

The revised final version (of the DPG) produced by Libby merely softened some of the hard edges of the earlier draft while preserving some of its core concepts, such as actively shaping the security environment, acting alone when necessary, and maintaining a dominant edge in military capabilities. Many of the ideas contained in the draft DPG were also revived repeatedly over the next decade, serving as a broad framework for building a new neoconservative consensus whose preeminent expression ultimately arrived in the form of President George W. Bushs 2002 National Security Strategy.

We also know this to be true when in December 2001, Jim Lobe of the Inter Press Service (IPS), reported that:

When he {Bush} saw it [the 1992 draft DPG] shortly after the Gulf War ten years later, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator Joseph Biden, denounced it as a prescription for literally a Pax Americana. The past, as is said, is prologue.
He also said in that article:

At the time, Biden stated that two relatively obscure political appointees at the Pentagon were charged with drafting plans for U.S. defense strategy over the following decade. The authors now are back in key positions and their vision appears to be reviving.
It would also be shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, an influential, neoconservative-led pressure group called the Project for the New American Century issued a letter to President Bush calling for a dramatic reshaping of the Middle East as part of the war on terror.

In the open letter to President Bush they commended his newly declared war on terrorism and urged him not only to target Osama bin Laden but also other supposed perpetrators, including Saddam Hussein and Hezbollah. This letter also made one of the first arguments for regime change in Iraq as part of the war on terror. They did so by arguing that this was necessary even if the Hussein regime was unconnected to the attacks.

As the letter stated:

It may be that the Iraqi government provided assistance in some form to the recent attack on the United States. But even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism.
In that same letter the PNAC also said this to President Bush:

To undertake this new war, it would be necessary to inject more money into the U.S. defense budget: A serious and victorious war on terrorism will require a large increase in defense spending. Fighting this war may well require the United States to engage a well-armed foe, and will also require that we remain capable of defending our interests elsewhere in the world. We urge that there be no hesitation in requesting whatever funds for defense are needed to allow us to win this war.
It will also be from this letter that President Bush in 2002 issued the “Bush Doctrine” This Doctrine was described by Robert Jervis this way:

The Bush Doctrine is composed of a strong belief in the importance of a states domestic regime in determining its foreign policy and the related judgment that this is an opportune time to transform international politics; the perception of great threats that can be defeated only by new and vigorous policies, most notably preventive war; a willingness to act unilaterally when necessary; and, as both a cause and a summary of these beliefs, an overriding sense that peace and stability require the United States to assert its primacy in world politics. Chris Dolan and David Cohen, The War about the War: Iraq and the Politics of National Security Advising in the G.W. Bush Administrations First Term, Politics & Policy, vol. 34, no. 1, March 2006

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